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non-recognition treatment.
• No later than five business days after the transfer of
qualified indicia of ownership of the property to the EAT, the
taxpayer and the EAT enter into a QEAA providing that the
EAT is holding the property for the benefit of the taxpayer in
order to facilitate a like-kind exchange and the taxpayer and
the EAT agree to report the acquisition, holding and
disposition of the property as provided in Rev. Proc. 2000-
37.12
• No later than 45 days after the transfer, the relinquished
property is properly identified.
• No later than 180 days after the transfer, the property is
transferred to the taxpayer as replacement property13 or is
transferred to a person who is not the taxpayer or a
disqualified person as relinquished property.
• Finally, the combined time period that the relinquished and
replacement properties are held in QEAA does not exceed 180
days.14
The revenue procedure15 states that property will not fail to
be treated as held in a QEAA as a result of legal or contractual
arrangements enumerated in Rev. Proc. 2000-37.16 Also,
property will not fail to be treated as being held in a QEAA
merely because the accounting, regulatory or state, local or
foreign tax treatment of the arrangement between the taxpayer
and the EAT is different from the treatment in Rev. Proc.
2000-37, § 4.02(3).17
Effective date
The procedure is effective for QEAAs entered into on or
after September 15, 2000.  There is, however, no inference
intended for those entered into prior to that date.18
FOOTNOTES
1 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).  See generally 4 Harl
Agricultural Law § 27.03[8][a][ii][C] (2000); Harl,
Agricultural Law Manual § 4.02[16] (2001).  See also
Harl, “Identifying Property in a Like-Kind Exchange” 7
Agric. L. Dig. 101 (1998).
2 I.R.C. § 1031.
3 Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
4 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3)(A).  See Smith v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1997-109, aff’d, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,928 (4th
Cir. 1997) (no proof that replacement properties identified
within 45 days after sale dates); Dobrich v. Comm’r, 99-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,826 (9th Cir. 1999) (failure to
identify replacement property within 45 days; also,
taxpayers in constructive receipt of income).
5 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(b)(2)(ii).
See St. Laurent v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-150
(replacement property transfer not completed within 180-
day period; replacement property not like-kind);
Christensen v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-254, aff’d, 98-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,352 (9th Cir. 1998) (transfers
not completed within specified period; argument
unsuccessful that four month extension of time to file could
have been obtained).
6 Th  preamble to the final regulations on like-kind
exchanges stated that the deferred exchange rules under
I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3) do not apply to reverse-Starker
exchanges (where the replacement property is acquired
b fore the relinquished property is transferred) and that the
final regulations do not apply to such exchanges.  T.D.
8346, 1991-1 C.B. 150, 151.  The preamble to the final
regulations stated that the Department of the Treasury and
the Internal Revenue Service would continue to study the
applicability of the like-kind exchange rules to such
transactions.  Id.
7 I.R.B. 2000-40, 308.
8 I.R.B. 2000-40, 308 (allows accommodation party to be
treated as owner of the property for tax purposes, enabling
transactions to qualify as like-kind exchange).
9  Id
10  Id
11  Id
12 I.R.B. 2000-40, 308.
13 The revenue procedure (Rev. Proc. 2000-37, I.R.B. 40,
308) does not address why the safe harbor provisions do
not state that the property must be received by the earlier
of 180 days after the date of transfer of the taxpayer’s
property or the due date, including extensions, of the
transferor’s tax return for the tax year in which the transfer
occurred.  I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3)(B).
14 Rev. Proc. 2000-37, I.R.B. 2000-40, 308.
15 Id.
16 I.R.B. 2000-40, 308.
17 Id.
18 Rev. Proc. 2000-37, I.R.B. 2000-40, 308.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
EQUINE IMMUNITY STATUTE. The plaintiff was injured
while riding on a practice sled pulled by two horses used in
pulling competitions. The plaintiff fell off the sled when the
horses suddenly started to move after the sled had been halted.
The plaintiff sued for negligence in the design and maintenance
of the sled. The defendant argued that the defendant was not
liable for the injury under the equine immunity statute, Wis. Stat.
§ 895.481 and the recreational immunity statute, Wis. Stat. §
895.52. Only the first statute was applied in this case. The
defendant argued that (1) the equine immunity statute applied
only to equine professionals and (2) that an exception applied
because the equipment was defective. The court held that the
statute did not limit its application to professionals. The court
also eld that the statute applied to the accident involved in this
cas  because there is an inherent risk that horses will move
suddenly and without warning. The court held that the claim of a
defect in the design and maintenance of the sled did not bar
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application of the statute because the plaintiff failed to allege
how any defect in the sled caused the plaintiff to fall.  Kangas v
Perry, 620 N.W.2d 429 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000).
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
ABANDONED PROPERTY. The debtor filed for chapter 7
and the estate included a parcel of real property. The property
remained in the estate for 26 months before the trustee
abandoned the property back to the debtor. The debtor sought to
charge the estate with the real estate taxes which accrued on the
property during the administration of the estate until the property
was abandoned. The trustee argued that the estate should not be
held liable for the taxes because the estate did not benefit from
the property. The court held that the estate was liable for the real
estate taxes because the debtor had no control over the property
while it was in the estate. The court noted that the trustee had 26
months to determine whether the property was beneficial to the
estate and could have abandoned the property and reduced the
tax burden much earlier. The court also noted that the trustee
provided no reason for the delay in abandoning the property. In
re Mailman Steam Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 256 B.R. 240
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2000).
DISCHARGE . The debtor needed to purchase farm supplies
on credit and filled out a credit application form provided by a
supplier. The debtor understated the debtor’s liabilities and
overstated the debtor’s assets on the form and failed to correct
the amounts when the final loan documents were signed several
days later. The loan was approved by a computerized scoring
system, based entirely on the information on the loan application.
The lender sought to have the loan balance declared
nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(2)(B) as obtained with
false information. The court held that (1) the asset and liability
figures were materially false because the figures portrayed the
debtor as having a positive net worth when the debtor had a
negative net worth; (2) the lender reasonably relied on the figures
because the application and the computerized scoring system
were the regular method of making loan decisions; and (3) the
debtor intended to deceive the lender because the debtor knew
the figures were false and would be used by the lender to decide
whether to make the loan. The court held that the loan balance
was nondischargeable as obtained using false financial
statements. In re Webb, 256 B.R. 292 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2000).
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtors, husband and wife, filed for
Chapter 7 and claimed their residence as an exempt homestead
under Iowa Code § 561.16. The residence was purchased in 1998
and the schedules showed that at least some of the outstanding
debts were incurred prior to the purchase of the residence. The
trustee objected to the homestead exemption because, under Iowa
Code § 561.21, a homestead was subject to execution to the
extent that the debtors’ debts were incurred prior to the purchase
of the residence. The debtors argued that Section 522(c)
preempted the Iowa exceptions to the homestead exemptions
because Section 522(c) exempts exempt property from debts
which arose prior to the bankruptcy petition. The court noted that
In re Weinstein, 164 F.3d 677 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 527
U.S. 1036 (1999), held that Section 522(c) preempted state law
exceptions to exemptions, but the court declined to follow that
decision and held that the debtors’ residence was not exempt
from debts which arose prior to the debtors’ purchase of the
residence. In re Norkus, 256 B.R. 298 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa
2000).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE . The debtors filed their 1992 tax return on
October 15, 1993 without paying the taxes. The debtors made a
few small payments on the taxes but then filed for Chapter 13 in
May 1996. The 1992 taxes were included in the case and the case
was voluntarily dismissed in March 1997 on the same day that
the debtors filed for a new Chapter 7 case. The debtors argued
that the 1992 taxes were dischargeable because they were filed
more than three years before the Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. The
c rt held that the three year period in Section 523(a)(1) was
tolled during the Chapter 13 case; therefore, the taxes were
n ndischargeable. In re Young, 233 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2000).
CORPORATIONS
DISSOLUTION. The plaintiff owned one-third of the stock of
a family farm corporation, with the other two thirds owned by the
plaintiff’s brother and sister. The corporation’s certificate of
incorporation included a provision that a supermajority vote of
75 percent of the shareholder interests was required for several
actions by the corporation, including dissolution. The parties
began to disagree  on corporate management and the plaintiff
sought a dissolution of the corporation by filing an action in state
court. The corporation argued that the certificate of incorporation
controlled to require a vote by 75 percent of the shareholder
interests to dissolve the corporation. Under Oklahoma law, 18
Okla. Stat. § 1006(B), shareholders could agree to increase the
votes needed for any corporate action. However, 18  Okla. Stat. §
953(D) permits a minority shareholder to bring an action for
judicial dissolution of a corporation. The court found that the
certificate of incorporation provision requiring the supermajority
affected only actions of the corporation and did not affect the
right of a minority shareholder to bring a judicial action for
dissolution. Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff was not
barred by the certificate of incorporation from bringing an action
for dissolution. Sutter v. Sutter Ranch Corp., 14 P.3d 58
(Okla. 2000).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
ANNOUNCEMENT
A one- ay conference, "Fixing the Fair Act," will be held at
the National Press Club, Washington, D.C. on March 27,
2001. The conference is sponsored by Schnittker & Associates
and the Iowa State University Center for International
Agricultural Finance (Neil E. Harl is the Center Director).
This is an opportunity to interact with some of the leading
thinkers on the various dimensions of farm policy. Complete
information may be obtained from John Schnittker, 1637
Calzada Avenue, Santa Ynez, California 93460, Tel. 805-686-
5260 or via e-mail at jasjad@silcom.com.
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES ACT .
The Agricultural Marketing Service filed a complaint against the
plaintiff for failure to make full payment promptly for 633 lots of
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produce. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the plaintiff
did violate PACA and recommended the revocation of the
plaintiff’s PACA license. The ALJ presented an oral decision and
stated that the decision would be final in 35 days after service of
the opinion unless an appeal was filed. A written opinion was
filed later. The hearing clerk sent the written opinion to the
plaintiff with a letter which stated that the plaintiff had  30 days
after receipt of the opinion in which to appeal the decision. The
plaintiff filled an appeal within 30 days after receiving the
written opinion but more than 35 days after the oral opinion. The
Judicial Officer refused to hear the appeal as untimely filed. The
plaintiff argued that the USDA Rules of Practice, found at 7
C.F.R. §§ 1.142(c)(4), 1.145(a), were so inconsistent as to fail to
provide adequate notice of the proper appeal time requirement.
Section 1.142(c)(4) provided that an appeal must be filed within
35 days after issuance of an oral opinion. Section 1.145(a)
provided that an appeal must be filed within 30 days after receipt
of service of a judge’s opinion. The court noted that the
regulations do not state that “issuance” of an opinion was
equivalent to “receipt of service” of an opinion. The court could
find no interpretation of the regulations which was consistent
with the plain language of both regulations; therefore, the court
held that the regulations were so inconsistent as to fail to provide
adequate notice of the appeal time requirement and ordered the
Judicial Officer to hear the appeal because the plaintiff did file an
appeal within the time allotted by one of the regulations. PMD
Brokerage v. USDA, 234 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
LEGISLATION. Legislation has been introduced which
would increase to $10,000,000 the maximum estate tax deduction
for family-owned business interests. H.R. 585. Legislation has
also been introduced which would repeal the estate, gift and
generation-skipping transfer taxes. The legislation would also
repeal the step-up of basis of estate property received from a
decedent. S 333.
MARITAL DEDUCTION. The IRS has issued proposed
regulations (see also infra under TRUSTS) governing the
definition of trust income for purposes of QTIP. The proposed
regulations provide that a spouse's interest satisfies the income
standard set forth in Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(b)-5(f), 25.2523(e)-
1(f) if the spouse is entitled to income as defined under a state
statute that provides for a reasonable apportionment between the
income and remainder beneficiaries of the total return of the trust
and that meets the requirements of Treas. Reg. § 1.643(b)-1(a).
As the examples under Treas. Reg. § 1.643(b)-1(a) make clear,
reasonable apportionment can be accomplished through a unitrust
definition of income or by giving the trustee the power to make
equitable adjustments between income and principal. 66 Fed.
Reg. 10396 (Feb. 16, 2001), amending Treas. Reg. §§
20.2056(b)-5(f), 20.2056(b)-7(d).
The taxpayer was the surviving spouse of a decedent. The
decedent’s will provided for passing of a portion of the estate in
trust to the taxpayer. However, two trusts existed because the
second trust did not terminate or supersede the first trust;
therefore, a dispute arose among the taxpayer and other heirs as
to which trust controlled. The parties reached a settlement which
used the second trust as determining the property passing to the
taxpayer but provided for distribution of the estate outside of the
trusts. As part of the agreement, the taxpayer disclaimed a
p rtio  of the marital trust share and disclaimed any right to
reco er gi t taxes which could arise from the disclaimers. The
IRS ruled that the amount received by the taxpayer under the
set lement was eligible for the marital deduction because the
taxpayer’  interest in the original trusts was QTIP. The IRS also
ruled that the taxpayer made a gift of the disclaimed interest in
the marital trust and the gift taxes which the taxpayer could have
rec vered as a result of the disclaimer. Ltr. Rul. 200106029,
Nov. 13, 2000.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS. The IRS has
issued proposed regulations which provide that the
administration of a pre-September 25, 1985 trust in conformance
with a state law that defines income as a unitrust amount, or
permits equitable adjustments between income and principal to
ensur  impartiality, and that meets the requirements of Treas.
Reg. § 1.643(b)-1(a) will not be treated as a modification that
shifts a beneficial interest to a lower generation beneficiary, or
increases the amount of a generation-skipping transfer,
subjecti g the trust to GSTT. See also infra under TRUSTS. 66
Fed. Reg. 10396 (Feb. 16, 2001), amending Treas. Reg. §
26.2601-1(b).
INCOME IN RESPECT OF DECEDENT . The decedent’s
will bequeathed property in trust to the surviving spouse which
was QTIP. The decedent also had substantial income in respect
of decedent and the issue was how to calculate the deduction for
IRD, under I.R.C. § 691, while allowing for the marital
deduction. The court held that the proper calculation of the
deduction was first to calculate the estate tax on the entire
amount (including therein the ordinary consideration of marital
share), and then to  recalculate the estate tax by removing the
IRD from the taxable estate (including therein a recomputation of
the marital share). The difference in estate tax was the Section
691 deduction. Estate of Cherry v. United States, 2001-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,223 (W.D. Ky. 2001).
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS- ALM  §
5.02[3].* In 1951, the decedent and parent owned most of the
stock of a family corporation. In order to meet the inheritance
and control desires of the shareholders, the decedent and parent
entered into an agreement for the transfer of the parent's stock at
death to the decedent in trust for life with remainders to the
pare t's grandchildren. The decedent agreed to transfer the
decedent's stock by will to the same trusts. The IRS argued that,
although the agreement was reached in bona fide bargaining and
the decedent did provide some consideration for the agreement,
the consideration was not full and adequate; therefore, the stock
in the trusts was included in the decedent's gross estate. The IRS
rgued that the consideration had to equal the value of the entire
property transferred; whereas, the estate argued that the
consideration only had to equal the value of the remainder
interest transferred. The Tax Court held that the value of the
decedent's future contribution of stock was not sufficient
consideration for the parent's agreement to transfer stock to the
trusts; therefore, the decedent's interest in the trust was not
received for adequate consideration. The Tax Court included the
value of the stock in the trusts in the decedent's gross estate,
decreased by the value of the decedent's stock contributed to the
trusts. The appellate court reversed, holding that the property
would not be included in the decedent’s estate if the decedent’s
consideration equaled the value of the remainder interest
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transferred by the parent. The case was remanded for a
determination of values. The appellate court also held that the
valuation date was the date of the original agreement. On
remand, the Tax Court held that the value of the life estate
received by the decedent under the agreement was less than half
the value of the remainder interest in the stock transferred to the
decedent’s children; therefore, the decedent did not receive full
and adequate consideration of the transfer of stock and the value
of the stock was included in the decedent’s estate. E tate of
Magnin v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2001-31, on rem from, 184
F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’g, T.C. Memo. 1996-25.
TRUSTS. The IRS has issued proposed regulations which
amend the definition of income under Treas. Reg. § 1.643(b)-1 to
take into account certain state statutory changes to the concepts
of income and principal. Under the proposed regulations, trust
provisions that depart fundamentally from traditional concepts of
income and principal (that is, allocating ordinary income to
income and capital gains to principal) will generally continue to
be disregarded, as they are under the current regulations.
However, amounts allocated between income and principal
pursuant to applicable state law will be respected if state law
provides for a reasonable apportionment between the income and
remainder beneficiaries of the total return of the trust for the
year, taking into account ordinary income, capital gains, and, in
some situations, unrealized appreciation. Similarly, a state law
that permits the trustee to make equitable adjustments between
income and principal to fulfill the trustee's duty of impartiality
between the income and remainder beneficiaries is a reasonable
apportionment of the total return of the trust. In addition, the
proposed regulations provide that an allocation of capital gains to
income will be respected if directed by the terms of the
governing instrument and applicable local law. Similarly, if a
trustee, pursuant to a discretionary power granted to the trustee
by local law or by the governing instrument (if not inconsistent
with local law), allocates capital gains to income, the allocation
will be respected, provided the power is exercised in a reasonable
and consistent manner. The proposed changes to the regulations
will permit trustees to implement a total return investment
strategy and to follow the applicable state statutes designed to
treat the income and remainder beneficiaries impartially. At the
same time, the limitations imposed by the proposed regulations
ensure that the provisions relying on the definition of income
under I.R.C. § 643(b) are not undermined by an unlimited ability
of the trustee to allocate between income and principal.
    Under the proposed regulations, capital gains will be
included in distributable net income under certain circumstances
that are directed by the terms of the governing instrument and
applicable local law. Thus, any capital gain that is included in the
I.R.C. § 643(b) definition of income is included in distributable
net income. Similarly, any capital gain that is used to determine
the amount or the timing of a distribution to a beneficiary is
included in distributable net income. Capital gains are also
included in distributable net income if the fiduciary, pursuant to a
discretionary power granted by local law or by the governing
instrument (if not inconsistent with local law), treats the capital
gains as distributed to a beneficiary, provided the power is
exercised in a reasonable and consistent manner. Thus, if a
trustee exercises a discretionary power by consistently treating
any distribution in excess of ordinary income as being made from
realized capital gains, any capital gain so distributed is included
in dist ibutable net income. 66 Fed. Reg. 10396 (Feb. 16, 2001),
amending Treas. Reg. §§ 1.643(a)-3,  1.643(b)-1, 1.651(a)-2.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
LEGISLATION . Legislation has been introduced which
would treat payments under the Conservation Reserve Program
as rentals from real estate. S. 315.  Legislation has been
introduced which would (1) increase the deduction for health
insurance for self-employed persons to 100 percent, (2) exclude
gain from the sale of farmland just as gain is excluded from the
sale of a residence, (3) allow farmers to use the lesser tax
produced by either income averaging or alternative minimum tax,
a d (4) allow a deduction for FARRM accounts. S. 333.
BAD DEBTS. The taxpayer had made loans to the taxpayer’s
fa her but the loans were not evidenced by written notes and had
no stated interest or repayment schedule. The taxpayer also failed
to show that any payments were made. The taxpayer claimed that
the debt became worthless when the father’s business burned
down; however, the taxpayer provided no evidence of the
fa her’s n t worth or other financial status in the tax year when
the loan was claimed as a bad debt deduction. The court held that
the deduction was not allowed because the taxpayer failed to
show h  existence of a bona fide debt or that the debt was
worthless in the tax year of the claimed deduction. Flood v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-39.
BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer operated a laundry
busines and claimed business deductions for travel, meals,
entertainment, office, rent, utilities and automobile reapir
expenses. The deductions were disallowed, except to the extent
allowed by the IRS, for lack of substantiation because the
taxpay r did not have full and accurate records to distinguish the
expenses from personal expenses. The taxpayer also claimed
d ductions associated with a home office. The deductions were
disallowed because the taxpayer’s primary business location was
at the laundry. Clark-Hernandez v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary
Op. 2001015.
DIS STER PAYMENTS . On January 5, 2001, the President
determined that certain areas in Oklahoma were eligible for
assistance under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, as a result of a severe winter ice storm on
December 25, 2000. FEMA-1355-DR. On January 8, 2001, the
President determined that certain areas in Texas were eligible for
assi t  under the Act as a result of severe a winter ice storm
begi ning on December 12, 2000. FEMA-1356-DR. On January
10, 2001, the d  that certain areas in Michigan were eligible for
assistance under the Act as a result of record snow beginning on
D c mber 11, 2000. FEMA-3160-EM. On February 5, 2001, the
President determined that certain areas in Florida were eligible
fo  assistance under the Act as a result of severe freezing
begi ning on December 1, 2000. FEMA-1359-DR. Accordingly,
a taxpayer who sustained a loss attributable to the disasters may
d duct the loss on his or her 1999 federal income tax return.
IRA.  The taxpayer established an IRA in 1976 and made only
deductible contributions over several years. In 1997 when the
taxpayer was 56 years old, the taxpayer encountered financial
difficulties and withdrew $6,000 from the IRA. The taxpayer did
not use the money for any of the purposes entitled to an
exception under I.R.C. § 72(t)(2) but used the money for personal
38 Agricultural Law Digest
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expenses. The taxpayer argued that the withdrawal should not be
included in gross income and should not be subject to the 10
percent additional tax because the money was withdrawn when
the taxpayer was having financial difficulties. The court held that
there was no financial difficulties exception under I.R.C. § 72(t);
therefore, the the taxpayer had to include the withdrawn money
in income and pay an additional 10 percent tax on that amount.
Gallagher v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-34.
INSTALLMENT METHOD OF REPORTING . The IRS has
announced that, consistent with the change in law effected by the
Installment Tax Correction Act, an accrual method taxpayer that
entered into an installment sale on or after December 17, 1999,
and filed a federal income tax return by April 16, 2001, reporting
the sale on an accrual method (and, thus, an amount realized
equal to the selling price) has the consent of the Secretary to
revoke its effective election out of the installment method,
provided the taxpayer files, within the applicable period of
limitations, amended federal income tax return(s) for the taxable
year in which the installment sale occurred, and for any other
affected taxable year, reporting the gain on the installment
method. Thus, a taxpayer may not revoke its effective election
out of the installment method if the taxable year in which any
payment on the installment obligation was received has closed.
Notice 2001-22, I.R.B. 2001-__.
MILEAGE RATE. The IRS has informed CCH that there will
be no change in the standard mileage rate of 34.5 cents per mile
for 2001. See Rev. Proc. 2000-48, I.R.B. 2000-49, 570. The
announcement was in response to questions about the new
administration’s review of regulations and letters from members
of Congress suggesting that the increase in gas prices justified a
larger mileage rate. See http://www.irs.ustreas.gov.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM  § 7.03*
DEFINITION. The decedent had farmed with the decedent’s
brother in an oral partnership for several years. The decedent had
been more active in the farm and, after disagreements between
them arose, the decedent excluded the brother from the farm.
Several years later, during the tax years involved in this case, the
brother sued for dissolution of the partnership. A state court
ruling found that a partnership existed but that the decedent’s
capital account far exceeded the brother’s. The court ordered the
50 percent split of partnership income after repayment of the
capital accounts. The partnership property was sold with all
proceeds used to repay the decedent. The decedent’s estate
argued that the state court adjudication proved that a partnership
existed and that the brother’s share of taxable income was 50
percent. The Tax Court held that a partnership existed but that
the decedent held 100 percent of the partnership interests because
the brother was excluded from the partnership business and the
decedent’s capital account far exceeded the value of the
partnership assets. Estate of Tobias v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2001-37.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in January 2001, the
weighted average is 5.91 percent with the permissible range of
5.32 to 6.21 percent (90 to 106 percent permissible range) and
5.32 to 6.50 percent (90 to 110 percent permissible range) for
purposes of determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. §
412(c)(7).  Notice 2001-15, I.R.B. 2001-589.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3]*
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES. The decedent died before
reaching age 40 and was an income beneficiary of a trust which
owned S corporation stock. The trust was a QSST and provided
that, if the decedent died before age 40, the trust corpus passed to
the d cedent’s heirs or the heirs of the grantor of the trust. The S
corporation had nondeductible passive losses remaining when the
dece ent died and the estate claimed the trust’s share of these
losses on the decedent’s last income tax return and elected to
carry the excess losses back to the previous three income tax
returns. The IRS ruled that, under I.R.C. § 469(g)(2), the passive
losses became deductible against nonpassive income upon the
death of the decedent and could be carried back under the net
op rating loss rules. FSA Ltr. Rul. 200106018, Nov. 3, 2000.
SHAREHOLDERS. The taxpayer owned S corporation stock
and transferred some of the stock to a limited liability company
for a 100 percent interest in the LLC. The taxpayer also
transferr  stock  and all of the LLC interest to a limited
partnership in exchange for 100 percent interest in the limited
partnership. Neither the LLC or limited partnership elected to be
taxe as a corporation. The IRS ruled that the ownership of the
stock by the LLC and limited partnership, both disregarded
e tities, would cause the termination of the S corporation status.
Ltr. Rul. 200107025, Nov. 17, 2000.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
March 2001
AnnualSemi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 4.86 4.80 4.77 4.75
110 percent AFR 5.35 5.28 5.25 5.22
120 percent AFR 5.84 5.76 5.72 5.69
Mid-term*
AFR* 5.07 5.01 4.98 4.96
110 percent AFR* 5.59 5.51 5.47 5.45
120 percent AFR*6.10 6.01 5.97 5.94
Long-term
AFR 5.58 5.50 5.46 5.44
110 percent AFR 6.14 6.05 6.00 5.98
120 percent AFR 6.71 6.60 6.55 6.51
*Not : Th  CCH published Mid-term rates are identical to the
February mid-term rates and may be in error. We will publish
any correction in the next issue.Rev. Rul. 2001-12, I.R.B. 2001-
__.
SALE OF JOINTLY OWNED PROPERTY . The taxpayer
had been married and during that marriage, the taxpayer and
former spouse had purchased as joint tenants a townhouse which
was used as a rental property. The couple decided to sell the
property and the property was sold at a gain. The sale proceeds
were issued in a single check, although the taxpayer had
requested separate checks because the couple were in the process
of divorcing. The couple disagreed on how the proceeds were to
be split and the taxpayer refused to endorse the check. The
former spouse then deposited the check in an old joint checking
acc unt, used some of the proceeds to satisfy an old joint debt
and slowing transferred the remainder to the spouse’s individual
account. The divorce decree ordered the former spouse to pay the
taxpayer the taxpayer’s one-half share of the proceeds. The
taxpay r did not include the taxpayer’s share of the gain in
income, arguing that the taxpayer did not receive the proceeds
until the next tax year. The court held that the taxpayer was liable
for one-half of the gain from the sale of the property because the
taxpayer was entitled to one-half of the proceeds, even though
the taxpayer failed to protect the taxpayer’s rights to the proceeds
until the divorce decree. Zimmerman v. Comm’r, T.C.
S mmary Op. 2001-13.
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SALE OF RESIDENCE .  This case involved tax law in effect
prior to amendments in 1997. On October 30, 1995, the
taxpayers, husband and wife, sold their residence for $310,000.
The taxpayers purchased a vacant lot on May 2, 1996 for
$111,000 and, on July 7, 1997, entered into a contract to build a
residence on the lot for a cost of $388,000. During the
construction, the taxpayers lived on the lot in a mobile home set
on concrete pillars. The new residence was completed on August
19, 1998 and the taxpayers moved in after October 30, 1998. The
court held that the taxpayers were not allowed to rollover the
gain from the sale of their first residence under I.R.C. § 1034
because the taxpayer failed to purchase a replacement residence
of equal or greater value within two years after the sale of the
first residence. The court noted that, even if the residence in the
mobile home on the lot was considered a new residence, the cost
of the lot and mobile home was less than the proceeds fo the sale
of the first residence and rollover of gain would still not be
allowed. Swarthout v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-16.
The taxpayer operated a trucking business and had purchased a
residence in New Jersey. The taxpayer discovered that the
taxpayer could earn sufficient annual income by driving the truck
in the winter in Florida. The taxpayer purchased rental property
in Florida and used an apartment while working in Florida. The
taxpayer obtained a Florida driver’s license, a Florida registration
for the truck and stopped paying New Jersey income tax. The
New Jersey residence was still used in the spring and summer by
the taxpayer as a residence. The New Jersey residence was sold
in 1996 and the taxpayer permanently moved to Florida. The IRS
argued that the taxpayer had changed residence to Florida prior
to the sale of the residence and was not eligible for the exclusion
of gain from the sale. The court held that the taxpayer had not
abandoned the New Jersey residence and had lived there for at
least 36 months of the five years before the sale; therefore, the
taxpayer was eligible to the exclude the gain from the sale of the
residence. Taylor v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-17.
TAX RATE. The IRS has announced that it has issued
Publication 533 which includes the adjusted 2001 tax-rate
schedules for use in determining estimated taxes for 2001. The
tax rates are lower than those included with the 2001 Form 1040-
ES package. Taxpayers may use either set of tables for paying
estimated taxes but must use Pub. 533 for all other purposes. See
http://www.irs.ustreas.gov.
STATE TAXATION
USE TAXES. The plaintiff was a dairy cooperative which
marketed the milk produced by its members. The Michigan
Department of Treasury (the Department) assessed use taxes
against the plaintiff’s machinery, equipment and supplies used to
test the members’ milk as required by federal and state laws and
regulations. The plaintiff argued that the property was exempt
from use tax, under Mich. Stat. § 7.555(4)(f), as property used in
agricultural production. The Department ruled that the
agricultural production of milk ended when the milk was put into
storage tanks. The Department argued that the testing was part of
the marketing of the milk and not the production of the milk. The
court held that the testing equipment, machinery and supplies
were exempt from use tax because the testing of the milk was a
part of the production process because the testing was required in
order for the milk to be suitable for sale. The court also held that
the exemption did not require that the plaintiff be directly
involved with the milk production, only that the services
provided by the plaintiff be a part of the milk production process.
Milk Producers v. Treasury Department, 618 N.W.2d 917
(Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
The taxpayer was a producer, processor and marketer of fresh
shell eggs and maintained a flock of over 1.3 million laying hens.
T e taxpayer purchased day-old chicks and raised them in
brooder houses which contain an automatic feeding, watering and
ventilation system. The system used cages which were similar to
the cages used for the laying hens in order to decrease the stress
when the chickens are transferred to the laying cages. The
plaint ff sought an exemption from use tax under Or. Stat. §
307.400(5)(e) as equipment used for producing fresh shell eggs.
The court held that the exemption was properly denied because
the raising of the chickens was not directly related to the
pr duction of eggs. The court noted that other use tax exemptions
allowed for other agricultural uses did not contain the “directly
related” language in order to qualify for the exemption; therefore,
the court held that the legislature wanted to limit the exemption
only to quipment used in the egg laying process. Willamette
Egg Farms, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 14 P.3d 609 (Or.
2000).
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
EMPLOYER. The plaintiff was injured while employed by a
professional S corporation wholly-owned by an orthodontist. The
plaintiff sought damages from the corporation for assault,
battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and
negligence. The corporation argued that the plaintiff was limited
to claim only workers’ compensation benefits as an employee of
the individual orthodontist. The plaintiff argued that the actual
employer was the corporation. The court held that an employer
does not lose the protection of the workers’ compensation statute
by using the corporate form of business organization; therefore,
the plaintiff was limited to claims under the workers’
compensation statute. Gunderson v. Harrington, 619 N.W.2d
760 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
ZONING
AGRICULTURAL AREA. The county had adopted a
comprehensive land use plan under the Washington Growth
Management Act and designated 40,000 acres in three
Agricultural Production Districts (ADPs) for exclusive
agricultural use. The county needed land for soccer fields and
other recreational use and amended the land use plan to provide
for temporary use of the ADP land for recreational uses. The
amendments specified that the land would revert to agricultural
use if needed. The county argued that the GMA allowed
exceptions to the ADP exclusive use requirement. The court
acknowledged that the GMA did promote the recreational use of
land, but the court held that the GMA required agricultural land
to be held exclusively for agricultural use if the land was suitable
for agriculture. The court noted that all of the land involved in
this case was prime farm land; therefore, the ADP land could not
be used for nonagricultural purposes. King County v. Central
Puget Sound, 14 P.3d 133 (Wash. 2000).
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The Agricultural Law Press presents
2001 AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINARS
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
   May 8-11, 2001  Airport Holiday Inn, Denver, CO
   June 19-22, 2001  Ramada Conference Center, Columbia, MO
   July 31, August 1-3, 2001  Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle, PA
   October 2-5, 2001  Interstate Holiday Inn, Grand Island, NE
Come join us for expert and practical seminars on the essential aspects of agricultural tax and law. Gain insight and
understanding from two of the nation’s top agricultural tax and law instructors.
The seminar are held at each site on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Registrants may attend one, two,
three or all four days, with separate pricing for each combination. On Tuesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and
ranch income tax. On Wednesday, Dr. Harl will cover farm and ranch estate planning. On Thursday, Roger McEowen
will cover farm and ranch business planning. On Friday, Roger McEowen will cover current developments in several
other areas of agricultural law. Your registration fee includes comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days
attended which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for
a small additional charge. A buffet lunch and break refreshments are also included in the registration fee.
Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
• Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private
annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
• Taxation of debt, taxation of bankruptcy, the latest on SE tax of rental of land to a family-owned entity; income
averaging; earned income credit; commodity futures transactions; paying wages in kind.
• Federal estate tax, including 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax, co-ownership discounts, alternate
valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business deduction (FOBD), marital deduction planning,
disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, trusts, and generation skipping transfer tax.
• Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
• Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited liability
companies.
• Legal developments in farm contracts, secured transactions, bankruptcy, real property, water law, torts, and
environmental law.
Special room discounted rates are available at each hotel for seminar attendees.
The seminar registration fees    for current subscribers     (and for multiple registrations from one firm) to the
Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles of Agricultural Law are $180 (one day), $345
(two days), $500 (three days), and $650 (four days).  The registration fees for    nonsubscribers   are $200, $385, $560
and $720, respectively. Please Note: the registration fees are higher for registrations within 20 days prior to the
seminar, so please call for availability and the correct fees. More information and a registration form are available
online at www.agrilawpress.com
SPECIAL EARLY NOTICE DISCOUNT
     Watch your mail for a postcard announcing the four seminars. Return that card by April 1, 2001 indicating
which seminars you plan to attend (no obligation to attend, however) and you are eligible for a 5 percent
rebate on your paid registration fees if you attend one or more sessions.
For more information, call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail to robe t@agr awpress.com
